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ABSTRACT 
This paper reveals the underlying market’s preferences over the on 
going Euro area sovereign debt crisis. It builds on a loss function with 
reference to the ‘basis’, the difference between the spread over swap 
and Credit Default Swap (CDS) for sovereign bonds. This loss function is 
general and flexible as it nests both a lin-lin and quad-quad functional 
form. The sample covers those Euro area member states most at risk of 
default namely: Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. Results show 
that market’s preferences for some Euro area countries, in particular 
Greece, have shifted towards pessimism post the Emergency Financing 
Mechanism (EFM) and troika. If anything, market’s reading of Euro area 
debt crisis points to the direction of serious misalignments post EFM and 
troika fuelled by growing pessimism and thus uncertainty. Having 
derived market’s preferences, we explore the impact of some specific 
market characteristics and fiscal rules and fiscal institutions on those 
preferences. Fiscal rules and institutions appear to improve market’s 
perception over fiscal sustainability, whilst the 3M Euribor, 3M Eurepo, 
outstanding debt to GDP, and iTraxx main investment grade index also 
shape market’s preferences.  
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Are there any Animal Spirits  
behind the Scenes  
of the Euro area Sovereign Debt Crisis? 
1. Introduction
Unraveling Ariadne’s thread of the Euro area debt crisis is by no means 
an easy task. Undoubtedly though, one cannot fail to notice that the 
Euro area sovereign debt crisis has open Pandora’s box with far reaching 
implications. The debt crisis in the last two years has been escalated 
with some Euro area Member States being under enormous pressure to 
finance their debt, whilst others experiencing unprecedented low cost to 
serve their sovereign debt. Rather than attempting to disentangle the 
causes of this crisis, that has been the norm in the literature to date, we 
opt to focus on revealing the underlying market’s preferences based on 
the notion of arbitrage opportunities. To this end, our attention is 
directed towards the echo that comes out of sovereign debt market in 
light of the on-going fiscal sustainability crisis. To capture this echo, we 
employ a novel approach that builds on a loss function with reference to 
the ‘basis’, the difference between the sovereign spread over swaps and 
sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Moreover, this paper assesses 
whether the market behaves rationally as it would do if there exist a 
symmetric underlying loss function or all interest parties share the same 
loss function.
1
  
1
Based on Elliott et al. 2005 rationality in sovereign bonds would imply that the underlying 
loss function, whether linear or non-linear, is symmetric.  
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The assumption that market’s participants should have a symmetric loss 
function and thus behave rational so as to exclude the possibility of 
market failure is of key importance. Most previous studies (Crowder and 
Hamed, 1993; Moosa and Al-Loughani, 1994; and Peroni and McNown, 
1998, and Kellard et al. 1999) argue that this assumption is plausible.  In 
absence of market imperfections one would expect that CDS spreads 
and sovereign bond spreads of the same maturity should be bounded by 
no-arbitrage conditions. This in turn, implies that the buyer of the 
sovereign bond could also buy protection for this bond in the CDS 
market so as to hedge against the default. No-arbitrage would imply that 
the price of the CDS equals the sovereign bond yield spread. To model 
the loss function, we opt for a generalised loss functional form proposed 
by Elliot et al. (2005). The shape parameter of this loss function is a-
priori unknown and could reveal information regarding market’s 
preferences. One of the advantages of this methodology is that it is not 
necessary to observe the underling model of forming sovereign bond 
spreads and CDS in order to test for asymmetries in preferences.  
The corner stone of our analysis lies within the ‘basis’. Blanco et al. 
(2005) show that there is a long run linear relationship between US 
corporate bond and CDS (see also for EU markets Norden and Weber, 
2004; Zhu, 2006; and De Wit, 2006). However, the existence of this long-
run relationship may not imply that short run arbitrage opportunities do 
not exist. Levin et al. (2005) show that market frictions generate non-
zero ‘basis’ between CDS and bond spread. Systematic and idiosyncratic 
factors can explain market frictions (De Wit, 2006, Levin et al., 2005). In 
a recent paper Favero et al (2010) argue that yields deferential in the 
Euro area increase in liquidity and risk. Setting aside those systematic 
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and idiosyncratic factors, the documented short run frictions would 
imply arbitrage opportunities as reflected in the ‘basis’. This paper builds 
on the perception of market frictions and the resulted arbitrage 
opportunities that could emerge.  
The data set used in this paper comes from Bloomberg and covers 5 
years maturity for daily and weekly sovereign spreads over swap and 
CDS. We focus on those countries in the Euro area mostly at risk of 
default, namely: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. This is the 
first time in the literature that evidence is provided for the shape 
parameter of the underlying loss function for those member states with 
difficulties to finance their long term obligations. The empirical evidence 
is robust across information sets and shows that overall loss preferences 
lean towards pessimism and thus asymmetry for most countries, and in 
particular for Greece. This could be interpreted that for certain Member 
States sovereign bond market is not ‘quite’ rational in terms of its 
underlying loss preferences as the present empirical evidence reveals 
that market imperfections prevail, unless all share the same underlying 
loss function. 
In addition, as part of sensitivity analysis, we explore a novel 
methodology proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2009) to assess whether 
there exist structural breakdowns in sovereign bonds market’s 
preferences over time. Such breakdowns could be caused by unexpected 
events, but also institutional interventions aiming at alleviating 
sovereign debt crisis in Euro area. Such interventions could alter 
market’s preferences and thus the shape of the loss function. This would 
essentially mean that the underlying loss function for some member 
  4 
states might not remain stable over time. In a second stage, based on 
breakdowns tests, we estimate the shape parameter of the loss function 
for the sub-periods identified so as to investigate whether those breaks 
in time have an impact on market’s behavior. For example, post May 
2010, the month the Emerging Financing Mechanism (EFM thereafter) 
and the memorandum of understanding with strong policy conditionality 
was signed by Greek Republic, arbitrage opportunities appear to be 
reinforced and markets clearly lean towards pessimism regarding the 
prospects of Euro area sovereign debt crisis.  
Having derived market’s preferences over, we subsequently study the 
impact of fiscal policy institutions and fiscal rules on those preferences in 
recent years. Over the last decade the number of fiscal rules in the Euro 
area has substantially increased (Public Finances in EMU, 2006 and 
2007). The empirical evidence shows that there is a link between fiscal 
rules and market’s expectations. Fiscal rules appear to improve market’s 
perceptions over the long-term sustainability of public finances. In terms 
of fiscal institutions, providing an independent assessment of 
compliance with existing national fiscal rules also improves market’s 
preferences. The results demonstrate that enhancing fiscal governance 
plays an important role in shaping market behaviour towards optimism, 
as it is perceived to contain debt crisis. In addition, market specific 
characteristics such as 3M Euribor, the spread between Euribor and 
Eurepo of the same duration, and iTraxx Main Investment Grade index 
also play a detrimental role in shaping market preferences.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we fit a 
loss function in sovereign bonds of those Euro area member states 
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under debt pressure for the first time in the literature. Second, we 
estimate the shape parameter of the underlying generalized flexible loss 
function. Third, given the shape of the loss function we test for 
structural breakdowns over time. Fourth, we re-examine asymmetries in 
the shape of loss function for periods identified by breakdowns tests. 
Fifth, we explore the impact of specific market characteristics on shape 
parameter of the underlying loss function. Lastly, we also assess the 
impact of fiscal rules and fiscal institutions on underlying market’s 
preferences over sovereign bonds. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section 
presents some recent stylized facts about the Euro area sovereign debt 
crisis. Section three provides the methodology of the loss function. 
Sections four and five report the data and discuss empirical results 
respectively. The last section offers some concluding remarks. 
2.  Stylized facts of the Euro area sovereign debt crisis 
Back in spring 2007 there was hardly any evidence of the storm in 
sovereign bonds that was about to break. At the time sovereign bonds 
across euro area Member States appeared to be on track for 
convergence in terms of yields. Moreover, the yield on the 10-year 
German sovereign bond was even somewhat lower than the Irish 
equivalent in July 2007. Alas, a dramatically different picture surfaced 
not long thereafter.  As investors searched for safety German bonds 
started to appear to them whilst Euro area Member States of south 
periphery and Ireland, for whom the subprime crisis was detrimental in 
exposing their perilous state of their fiscal balances, faced the harsh 
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reality of rising borrowing costs. By December 2009 it became clear that 
the Greek economy faced with the blink reality of not being able to 
finance its sovereign debt. The five years Greek sovereign bonds spread 
was 215 basis points above the swap rate at the end of December 2009. 
The equivalent spread for Ireland was about 45 basis points, whilst it 
was 28 basis points for Portugal.  Those spreads continued to rise ever 
since, and reached their pick in March 2011 at the height of the euro 
crisis when the Greek spread jumped to above 1100 basis points, the 
Irish and Portuguese spreads reached 772 basis points and 636 basis 
points respectively. There have been some fluctuations thereafter but 
overall the sovereign spreads of southern euro area and Ireland have 
remained at high levels ever since. These dramatic developments led to 
the Euro area debt crisis and have raised questions regarding the 
viability of the euro. 
In some detail, there exist some distinct episodes in the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis. In the beginning, as early as mid-2007 the 
subprime crisis did not bite into euro sovereign spreads, giving the false 
impressions to national governments at the time that they had 
weathered out the crisis. The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
resulted credit crunch triggered a widening of spreads of the weakest 
economies within the euro area, in particular towards the end of 2009. 
During this period sovereign spreads for some southern Euro area 
member states and Ireland showed stark divergence from triple A 
economies such as Germany. Then, in spring 2010, the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis burst that led spreads and CDS to record high levels. Hikes in 
Greek sovereign yields and CDS feast in to the rest of fiscally vulnerable 
southern euro area countries whilst Ireland followed suit, though in the 
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latter case it was due non-performing loans of private banks that has to 
be rescued.  
Diagram 1 presents the Euro area spreads over time for the southern 
periphery and Ireland. In May 2010, the month that Greece applied for 
financial assistance to the Euro area and the IMF, the spread between 
the spread on a 5-year Greek spread reached values higher than 1100 
basis points.  
DIAGRAM 1: Spreads over Swaps, 5 years maturity, weekly 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
The Greek memorandum of understanding contained strong policy 
conditionality of Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM thereafter), a 
joint initiative of the IMF, the EU Commission and the ECB, and it was 
signed in May 2010. Following the EFM, the Greek spread fell to around 
607 basis points in end May 2010. Alas, markets found hard to accept 
that the EFM could act as a therapy to the sovereign credit crisis and 
thereby sovereign spreads started to rise once more in summer of 2010. 
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By 2011, the Greek spread reached levels as high as 2000 basis point 
whilst it went beyond this threshold late in 2011. Likewise, the spreads 
for Portugal and Ireland sharply climbed up in 2011.  
In parallel with sovereign spreads that provide guidance over the credit 
risk CDS could act as warning signal within a risk management 
framework. CDS reflect the premium investors are willing to pay to 
insure against a credit event. Diagram 2 presents recent developments 
in Euro area CDS and shows that there have been hikes similar in pattern 
with the ones of spreads. It is factual to observe that prior to the Greek 
debt tragedy, sovereign CDS for Euro area have not been that 
interesting, as there was hardly any sign of a viable market. Once the 
Greek sovereign default became a real threat sovereign CDS market for 
Euro area has sparked into life. Duffie (2010) argues that hikes in CDS 
could show remarkably obstinacy in the aftermath of credit crunch. He 
suggests that there are several reasons behind these hikes, such as: 
severe depletion of capital, large distortions in arbitrage, funding risk 
and market liquidity risk, whilst counterparty risk and default risk could 
also play a role but not as significant. Fontana and Scheicher (2010) 
argue that short-term expectations regarding sovereign yields in the 
light of imminent increases in sovereign bond issuance, together with 
market’s expectations regarding the probability of default, could 
contribute to high CDS. Favero et al (2010) demonstrate that liquidity 
and risk affect government bonds yields in the Euro area. What the 
literature fail to account is that the ‘basis’ could echo some market’s 
concerns, preferences over the unfolding Euro area debt crisis. 
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DIAGRAM 2: Credit Default Swaps, 5 years maturity, weekly 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Undoubtedly, the dramatic developments of Euro area sovereign debt 
crisis warrant a study of underlying market’s preferences that, in turn, 
could shed new light. However, most studies examine the role of fiscal 
imbalances (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009, Mody, 2009, Haugh et al., 2009), of 
market liquidity or market integration (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009), 
of migration risk (rating downgrades), and to less extend the risk of 
outright default (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010). Fontana and Scheicher 
(2010) and Favero et al (2010) were the first to study the movement of 
Euro area sovereign spreads and CDS using various covariates. The 
authors build on the earlier study of Blanco et al. (2005) where a long 
run linear relationship between US corporate bond and CDS is found, 
whilst Levin et al. (2005) show that market frictions generate non-zero 
CDS-bond spread ‘basis’.  
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In this paper we opt for a different methodology as we aim not to study 
the arbitrage conditions of sovereign debt but to reveal the underlying 
market preferences that ultimately would affect such conditions. We 
build on the notion of ‘basis’ as a result of market frictions and arbitrage 
opportunities in the short run (Blanco et al, 2005). This would imply that 
an investor with a long position in sovereign bond could also buy 
protection in CDS market to hedge against the risk of default given 
liquidity constrains and equal maturity in both the bond and CDS. In the 
event of no-arbitrage the CDS should equal the sovereign bond spread 
over swap.
 2
 
3. Methodological Framework of the Underlying Loss Function 
We model the ‘basis’ between sovereign spread and CDS as the main 
component of market’s generalized loss function given there are short 
run frictions and as result misalignment in prices. Moreover, the main 
variable of such market’s loss function is its shape parameter ‘alpha’, ‘α 
alpha’ thereafter, that would reveal whether the loss function is 
symmetric or otherwise asymmetric. To model the generalised loss 
function, we opt for a functional form as in Elliot et al. (2005). The shape 
parameter of this loss function is not known and could reveal 
                                                 
2
 There are numerous trading strategies in the sovereign CDS market. First, a trader could 
take a long and short position simultaneously to exploit misalignments in prices. Second, one 
could sell CDS protection on sovereign bonds and buy CDS protection on corporate bonds in 
the same country. Third, one could be net buyer of sovereign CDSs. The last case is 
particularly popular among hedge funds. Fourth, portfolio managers could buy sovereign 
CDSs to hedge against macroeconomic risks. There are also synthetic options such as first to 
default CDSs on sovereign risk. These strategies are only a portion of the existed ones and 
point out to the direction of complexities one could face attempting to disentangle the 
impact of market’s expectations on sovereign CDS spreads. For example, the recent hikes in 
CDS spreads could be the outcome of expectations regarding future increases in sovereign 
bond issuance.  
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information regarding market preferences. Note that there is not a 
prerequisite to observe the model of forming sovereign spreads and CDS 
so as to estimate the shape parameter of the loss function.  
Moreover, following Elliott et al. (2005) we define CDSt ≡θ’Wt be the CDS 
conditional on the information set Ft in which θ is an unknown k-vector 
of parameters, θ∈  Θ, with Θ compact in 
kR , and Wt is an h-vector of 
variables that are Ft measurable.
3
 Essentially, Wt represents the full set 
of factors and is known to the market at time t and could affect their 
preferences. 
When the CDSt are formed we assume that, given the Spreadt and Wt, 
the market follows a generalized flexible loss function L, which could 
reveal their preferences, defined by  
L(p,α) ≡ [α + (1− 2α)1(Spreadt −CDSt < 0)] Spreadt −CDSt
p
                  (1) 
where p takes values 1,2, if p=1 the loss function is linear and for p=2 is 
quadratic, whilst α∈(0,1) and depicts the shape parameter of the loss 
function. 1 is an indicator and (Spreadt -CDSt) is the difference between 
the spread over swap and CDS, implying an error, which represent 
market imperfections and thus short run arbitrage opportunities.  
The key parameter in equation (1) is α∈(0,1), the ‘alpha’, as it contains 
information regarding the shape of the loss function and thus its 
symmetry or asymmetry. 
                                                 
3
 Within this framework it is not necessary to know the underlying model of forming spreads 
and CDS. CDS could be considered as forward-looking prediction of spread plus a premium 
(Blanco et al, 2005). The premium is considered as fixed, and thus exogenous to the loss 
function. 
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By observing the sequence of CDSt, τ≤t<T+τ the estimate of ‘α’ is given 
using a linear GMM Instrumental Variable estimator
4
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As in Elliott et al. (2005) the estimator of αT is considered to be 
asymptotically normal and a J-statistic follows X²(d-1) for d>1 and takes 
the form: 
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If preferences were asymmetric then CDSt  under the generalised loss 
function of equation 1 would be an optimal forward looking of Spreadt if 
and only if the following first order optimality condition is met: 
                                                 
4
 In the empirical part of the paper three instruments are opted, a constant, the lagged 
difference between CDS and spread, and the lagged difference of CDS. 
5
 
^
S depends on αT and as a result the estimation takes place iteratively, assuming 
^
S =I in the 
first iteration to estimate αT until convergence. 
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E Wt 1(Spreadt−CDSt<0) −α( ) Spreadt −CDSt p−1 = 0        (5) 
where Wt is as above the full set of factors and are known to the market 
at time t and a is the loss asymmetry parameter. Once ‘α’ and p are 
known the market could use the first order condition to define CDSt in a 
unique way as proved by Elliott et al (2005). In another step, once CDSt is 
identified one could employ first order condition (5) to retrieve ‘α’ in a 
unique way. Moreover, Elliott et al. (2005) proves in Lemma 2 that the 
above first order condition is necessary to estimate ‘α’ employing a sub 
vector Vt of Wt.  
4. The Data Set 
The sovereign spread for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain at 
time “t”, (Spreadt) is measured as the difference between secondary-
market yield on the country’s 5-year bond and the swap rate. Since the 
swap rate is widely regarded by the markets as a ‘risk-free’ rate, the 
spread is considered as premium against risk of default. On the other 
hand, CDS echoes insurance premium against risk of default. Thus, CDS is 
forward-looking with regards to spreads. All variables are derived from 
Bloomberg and where missing from Datastream.  
Moreover, the CDS market is set so as the seller pays the buyer in the 
event of default before maturity of the contract. What defines a default 
event is not always forthright. Default events could take the form of 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default or acceleration, repudiation 
or moratorium (for sovereign entities), and restructuring. Albeit 
restructuring, as it is demonstrated by the Greek case, may not 
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constitute default. Based on the 1999 International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) documentation restructuring establishes 
‘a default event if either the interest rate or principal paid at maturity are 
reduced or delayed, or an obligation’s ranking in payment priority is 
lowered or there is a change in currency or composition of any payment’.  
The sovereign CDS also is a trading instrument and not a pure insurance 
instrument. Moreover, taking an outright position on spreads depends 
on traders’ expectations over a short horizon. To this end, CDS could be 
used for hedging macroeconomic uncertainty or risks. That is CDS could 
be used as a relative-value trading instrument by taking a short position 
in country X and a long position in country Y. This may also result to 
arbitrage trading that is sovereign bonds versus CDS. 
The observed high CDS premium during crisis could imply underling 
declining risk appetite, falling market liquidity, credit rating downgrades 
(migration risk)  (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010), or even ‘economic 
catastrophe risk’ (Berndt and Obreja, 2010), and not so much principal 
losses on outstanding debt. 
For example, when the ‘basis’ is negative sovereign bonds are costlier 
than CDS, implying that bond spreads are lower than CDS (see Diagram 
3). This, in turn, means that profit could be realised if ‘basis’ trade takes 
place that is to buy bond and CDS protection. In reality liquidity 
constraints do not abate and as a result buying bonds to short-sell, via a 
repo transaction, is not inexpensive. In addition, in case repo rates are 
low hedging positions is costly as bonds are hard to get and short-sell. 
The main drawback of costly bonds is that not all deliverable bonds 
could be necessarily due and payable should restructuring occur. Some 
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deliverable bonds could be cheaper, whilst deliverable bonds with long 
maturity or convertible bonds would be traded at a discount to short 
maturity bonds.  
DIAGRAM 3: The ‘‘‘basis’’’ (Spreadt -CDSt), 5-years maturity, weekly 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Moreover, the negative ‘basis’ strategy (see Greece) requires funding for 
buying bond position. During market turbulence traders are unwilling to 
enter such a position due to the price volatility, therefore ‘haircuts’ for 
the position could prove to be volatile and sizable. Gorton and Metrick 
(2009) show that repo market haircut takes central part during financial 
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crisis. Note the striking difference between movements in the ‘basis’ of 
Greece compared to Portugal and Ireland in recent months.  
To make things even more complicate what constitutes a default event 
is not an easy task. For example, concerning the histrionic Greek case, 
ISDA communication on 31
th
 of October 2011 EU over the restructuring 
of the Greek sovereign debt argues: ‘Based on what we know now, it 
appears from news reports that the Eurozone proposal involves a 
voluntary exchange that would not be binding on all holders.’ On 1
st
 
March 2012 ISDA in another communication argues that in the case of 
Greece and the voluntary haircut ‘…a Restructuring Credit Event has not 
occurred under Section 4.7(a) of the 2003 Definitions.’  Alas, on 9
th
 March 
2012 ISDA declared that ‘…that the invoking of the collective action 
clauses by Greece to force all holders to accept the exchange offer for 
existing Greek debt constituted a credit event under the 2003 ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions.’ In legal terms, Greek sovereign has defaulted in 
March 2012. Since then, there are no market data for Greek CDS and 
sovereign bonds other than treasury bills. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Asymmetry parameter estimates 
We estimate equations (2) and (3) using GMM with instruments for both 
the linear (p=1, linin-lin) and non-linear case (p=2, quad-quad). Three 
instruments are opted: a constant (that is D=1), lagged difference 
between Spread and CDS (D=2), as well as the lagged difference Spread 
(D=3). 
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Table 1 reports results. Our estimated loss function parameters are all 
statistically different from zero. For most cases ‘α’ takes values 
somewhat higher than 0.5 but close to 0.5 (see lin-lin case for D=1 and 
D=2 and quad-quad case for D=3), indicating rational loss preferences 
associated with a symmetric loss function. However, there is some 
variability for different set of instruments and also for the quad-quad 
case. Moreover, for the case of D=2 in quad-quad ‘α’ takes values below 
0.5 and away from symmetry. When the shape parameter ‘α’ takes 
values less than 0.5 it indicates optimistic preferences associated with an 
asymmetric loss function.  
TABLE 1: Asymmetric loss function for Greek Spreads over swap - 5 yr 
CDS, weekly 
Linear case, 05/09/2008 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.5285 0.0204 4.8027 180.1242 1.9396 136.038 
D=2 0.5479 0.0204 120.569 201.0684 123.4258 162.605 
D=3 0.5818 0.0146 273.8411 268.36 371.627 302.5771 
Non-Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.5951 0.0235 1.81E-27 139.8045 14.6803 75.0237 
D=2 0.45 0.0234 177.9079 149.6734 183.0547 165.9722 
D=3 0.4937 0.0079 208.5826 160.4143 264.9902 285.5281 
Estimates are based on D=1, 2, 3 instruments. The instruments are: a constant (that is D=1), 
lagged difference between Spread and CDS (D=2), as well as the lagged difference Spread 
(D=3). The equations (2) and (3) are estimated using GMM both the linear (p=1) and non-
linear case (p=2).  
J-statistics are distributed as X2 (D-1 for D>1) a
J
ˆ and X 
2
(D) for   the remaining J.  
Critical values for Χ2 (2): at 1% 9.21, at 5% 5.99, and at 10% 4.60. 
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Note that for ‘α’ greater than 0.5 the slope of the generalised loss 
function would be steeper for positive ‘basis’, which would imply that 
the market preferences would support higher CDS than spread. If this is 
so, the perceived loss by the market is much higher when the CDS, the 
insurance premium against default, is lower than the spread. A rising 
CDS would in turn highlight that the Greek sovereign debt crisis would 
be far from over and higher yields would be requested. On the other 
hand, if ‘α’ is lower than 0.5, once more we would have observed 
asymmetry but this time marker preferences would suggest that the loss 
of a negative ‘basis’ is high, and as result Spread should be higher than 
CDS. 
Elliott et al (2005) argue that deviations from symmetry would lead to 
deviations from rational behaviour unless all interest parties share the 
exact same loss function. This is something that will be hard to meet as 
different parties have different objectives. However, rationality could 
still be achieved if the underlying market loss function for sovereign debt 
is revealed to all interest parties so they, then, can adjust their 
preferences accordingly. This paper for the first time reveals the 
underlying preferences for a key market that has been in the epicentre 
of a financial turmoil in recent years. 
We also report J-statistics for three alternative null hypotheses, 
aaH ˆ:
0
=  (from the estimation), α=0.2, and α=0.8, the latter two 
representing optimistic and pessimistic preferences respectively. In 
particular for the non-linear loss function and for ‘α’ that are statistically 
different from 0.5 the likelihood to reject the null of 0.8 is lower.  
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TABLE 2: Asymmetric loss function for Spreads-5 yr CDS, weekly, 
05/09/2008 to 22/07/2011 
Portugal Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.4807 0.0086 3.1425 813.4794 5.0607 983.4059 
D=2 0.4802 0.0086 42.5789 820.3134 48.1276 990.8552 
D=3 0.3755 0.0083 1.4403 1.24E+03 1.54E+03 1.37E+03 
Portugal Non-Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.471 0.0124 2.2327 349.5264 5.56E+00 534.039 
D=2 0.4147 0.0119 214.9597 357.4935 2.35E+02 575.0179 
D=3 0.297 0.0102 405.8339 386.6739 5.83E+02 621.9189 
 
Italy Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.4807 0.0086 3.14E-25 813.4794 5.0607 983.4059 
D=2 0.4802 0.0086 42.5789 820.3134 48.1276 990.8552 
D=3 0.3755 0.0083 1.44E+03 1.24E+03 1.54E+03 1.37E+03 
Italy Non-Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.471 0.0124 2.23E-27 349.5264 5.56E+00 534.039 
D=2 0.4147 0.0119 214.9597 357.4935 2.35E+02 575.0179 
D=3 0.297 0.0102 405.8339 386.6739 5.83E+02 621.9189 
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Spain Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.4807 0.0086 3.14E-25 813.4794 5.0607 983.4059 
D=2 0.4802 0.0086 42.5789 820.3134 48.1276 990.8552 
D=3 0.3755 0.0083 1.44E+03 1.24E+03 1.54E+03 1.37E+03 
Spain Non-Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.471 0.0124 2.23E-27 349.5264 5.56E+00 534.039 
D=2 0.4147 0.0119 214.9597 357.4935 2.35E+02 575.0179 
D=3 0.297 0.0102 405.8339 386.6739 5.83E+02 621.9189 
 
Ireland Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.2507 0.0417 23.4132 1.4211 27 66.6735 
D=2 0.0587 0.0226 23.4065 48.509 69.3296 70.9639 
D=3 0.0574 0.0224 23.4966 51.2218 87.4611 88.375 
Ireland Non-Linear case 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.4073 0.0613 1.11E-29 7.6663 2.6042 45.7133 
D=2 0.1364 0.0398 15.2392 19.6943 59.2447 69.7312 
D=3 0.0899 0.028 16.0958 30.7642 71.9806 83.7809 
Estimates are based on D=1, 2, 3 instruments. The instruments are: a constant (that is D=1), 
lagged difference between Spread and CDS (D=2), as well as the lagged difference Spread 
(D=3). The equations (2) and (3) are estimated using GMM both the linear (p=1) and non-
linear case (p=2).  
J-statistics are distributed as X2 (D-1 for D>1) a
J
ˆ and X 2(D) for   the remaining J.  
Critical values for Χ
2
(2): at 1% 9.21, at 5% 5.99, and at 10% 4.60. 
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5.2 A test for structural breakdowns 
As we are dealing with a long time period, one could reasonably argue 
that during this period there must have been events that could alter the 
shape parameter, ‘α’, of the underlying loss function of both spread and 
CDS. In order to assess the existence of such events in time series we opt 
for a novel methodology proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2009) that 
tests breakdowns over time and builds on the framework of generalized 
loss function similar to the one used above.  
Following Giacomini and Rossi (2009) we consider 
{ }TtNsRZZ st ,...,1,,: 1 =∈→Ω≡ +  a stochastic process defined on a 
complete probability space (Ω, F, P), and partition the observed vector Zt 
as 
'' ),( tt XSpreadZ ≡ , where RSpread t →Ω: is the variable of interest, that 
is the spread, and 
s
t RX →Ω: is the vector of variables that form spreads, 
including CDS. 
This methodology builds a succession of τ-step-ahead Spreadt+τ using an 
out of sample process that encompasses dividing the sample T into an 
in-sample size m and an out-of-sample size n=T-m-τ+1. As in Giacomini 
and Rosi (2009) we allow for three schemes of forming spreads: (i) a 
fixed scheme, where the in-sample window at time t contains 
observations indexed 1,…,m; (ii) a rolling scheme, where in-sample 
window at time t contains observations indexed t-m+1,…,t; and (iii) a 
recursive scheme, where the in-sample window includes observations 
indexed 1,…,t.  
The time t future, )(
∧
tt βϕ , is produced by estimating a model over in-
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sample window at time t, with 
∧
tβ indicating the kx1 parameter estimate. 
Then the spread is evaluated by a loss function L( ),  with each out-of-
sample loss ))(,()(
∧
+
∧
+ ≡ ttttt fLL βϕβ ττ  corresponding to in-sample losses 
))(,()(
∧∧∧
≡ tjjtj pPLL ββ .  
Now given the in-sample and the out-of-sample loss we define ‘surprise 
loss’ as the difference between the out-of-sample loss at time t + τ and 
the average in-sample loss:  
)()()(
∧−∧
+
∧
+ −= tttttt LLSL βββ ττ  for t=m,…,T-τ.       (6) 
where )(
∧−
ttL β is the average in-sample loss computed over the in-sample 
window.  
The out-of-sample mean of the surprise losses is: 
)(1
__ ∧
+
−
=
−
+ ∑≡ tTt
T
mt
nm SLnSL βτ
         (7) 
We could state that out-of-sample mean of the surprise loss is simply: 
SLt+τ = Lt+τ − Lt   for  t = m,...,T −τ                   (8) 
where the out-of-sample loss is given by 
Lt+τ = L Spreadt+τ −CDSt+τ( )          (9) 
The average in sample loss tL  would be estimated by certain underlying 
schemes, such as 
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Fixed Scheme:            Lt =
1
m
L Spread j+τ − CDS j+τ( )
j=1
m−τ
∑
Rolling Scheme:         Lt =
1
m
L Spread j+τ − CDS j+τ( )
j=t−m+1
t−τ
∑
Recursive  Scheme:    Lt =
1
t
L Spread j+τ − CDS j+τ( )
j=1
t−τ
∑  
           (10) 
Based on equation (6), and given the underlying schemes (10), CDS as 
forward-looking information could be employed to define spread. If this 
is the case a test should show that the mean of equation (6) is close to 
zero. That is the test has a null hypothesis: 
0)(: *10 =





+
−
=
− ∑ βτ TtT mt SLnEH
, for all m, n.                     (11) 
And, the structural breakdown test statistic is:  
nmnm nnSLmt ,,, /,
∧
= στ 6                  (12) 
The main advantage of the methodology of Giacomini and Rossi (2009) is 
the robustness to the presence of unstable regressors. Next we test for 
breakdowns in spreads based on the above test statistic.
7
 Such 
breakdowns are defined as unexpected events, exogenous to the 
market, which could lead to default. In the event that a breakdown in 
spreads would arise the out-of-sample performance of the spread model 
is significantly worse than its in-sample performance.  
                                                 
6
 For information regarding the construction of the asymptotic variance estimator nm,
∧
σ see 
Giacomini and Rossi (2009). 
7
 Giacomini and Rossi (2009) have applied their method on the Phillips curve for the 
economy of US. 
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5.3 Results of Structural breakdowns 
After observing our time series we perform tests for structural breaks in 
the spreads for the following date: 07/05/2010, marking the date of 
signing the Emergency Financing Mechanism and the memorandum of 
understanding regarding policy conditionality. This has been a joint 
initiative of the IMF, the EU Commission and the ECB, aiming to provide 
financial assistance to Greece.  
The time horizon for spreads is considered as τ=1, τ=5 and τ=10 weeks 
ahead and we use several choices of lags.  
TABLE 2: t-stat and p-values of structural break in the loss function of 
the difference between 5 yr Greek Spreads over swaps and CDS, 
weekly. 
Structural break on 07/05/2010 
 tm,n,τ p-values 
 τ=1 
Scheme=1 3.2298 0.0116 
Scheme=2 3.7866 0.0269 
Scheme=3 3.6310 0.0552 
 τ=5 
Scheme=1 3.1160 0.0138 
Scheme=2 3.5863 0.0347 
Scheme=3 3.4595 0.0586 
 τ=10 
Scheme=1 2.9718 0.0377 
Scheme=2 3.3474 0.0846 
Scheme=3 3.2508 0.0978 
Scheme 1 is the fixed scheme, where the in-sample window at time t contains observations 
indexed 1,…,m; scheme 2 is a rolling scheme, where in-sample window at time t contains 
observations indexed t-m+1,…,t; and last scheme 3 is a recursive scheme, where the in-
sample window includes observations indexed 1,…,t. The lag for the Newey-West estimator 
is opted as n
1/3
 of the asymptotic variance. 
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Based on the evidence reported in Table 2 there are structural breaks. 
Moreover, under all schemes and for all time horizons the null of no 
structural breakdown is rejected. This result implies that the spread 
series do not remain stable over time, and this may result to changes in 
the shape parameters of the loss function. As part of sensitivity analysis, 
we should re-examine the shape parameter for the different periods 
identified by breakdown tests.   
5.4 Asymmetry in the loss function in sub-periods 
Table 3 and Table 4 presents parameter estimates of‘α’ for spreads for 
the sub periods from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 and from 05/09/2008 
to 07/05/2010 respectively, the latter marking the period post 
Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM thereafter).  
For the first sub-period, as reported previously, an asymmetric loss 
function that clearly leans towards optimism exists. In detail, ‘α’ takes a 
value lower than 0.5. For the non-linear case ‘α’ takes even lower values 
than 0.3.  
Interestingly, in the aftermath of the Emergency Financing Mechanism 
preferences seem to dramatically shift towards pessimism as ‘α’ is much 
higher than 0.5 in all cases. In the case of using three instruments (D=3) 
the non-linear loss function exhibits the highest value of asymmetry; ‘α’ 
= 0.97.  
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TABLE 3: Asymmetric loss function for 5 yr Greek Spreads over swap 
and CDS, weekly 
Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.4606 0.0274 8.2529 70.8429 2.0485 104.5333 
D=2 0.142 0.0192 146.8465 153.2434 111.3308 117.1562 
D=3 0.0442 0.0113 150.7396 212.9208 191.0684 137.5088 
Linear case, period from 27/04/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.7625 0.0258 1.6828 173.871 74.36 2.3913 
D=2 0.7604 0.0257 0.1497 173.8844 74.5431 2.4975 
D=3 0.9403 0.0143 56.3048 187.6885 187.5612 121.6407 
Non-Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.279 0.027 7.4429 9.9429 35.413 86.9294 
D=2 0.023 0.0075 110.0927 70.0733 37.5096 101.9112 
D=3 0.0208 0.0045 109.9094 125.0005 89.8798 102.2421 
Non-Linear case, period from 27/04/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.8088 0.0259 2.0328 145.0907 80.3412 0.1141 
D=2 0.8362 0.0232 5.6679 145.0964 84.7474 7.861 
D=3 0.9761 0.0069 41.0372 145.2198 145.5484 138.649 
Estimates are based on D=1, 2, 3 instruments. The instruments are: a constant (that is D=1), 
lagged difference between Spread and CDS (D=2), as well as the lagged difference Spread 
(D=3). The equations (2) and (3) are estimated using GMM both the linear (p=1) and non-
linear case (p=2).  
J-statistics are distributed as X2 (D-1 for D>1) a
J
ˆ and X 2(D) for   the remaining J.  
Critical values for Χ2 (2): at 1% 9.21, at 5% 5.99, and at 10% 4.60. 
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TABLE 4: Asymmetric loss function for 5 yr Greek Spreads over swap 
and CDS, weekly 
Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 07/05/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.3465 0.0262 1.089 2.851 31.0061 156.5886 
D=2 0.2994 0.0253 38.6074 43.3944 89.9243 168.7441 
D=3 0.0853 0.0154 103.6182 156.8048 238.2036 208.511 
Linear case, period from 07/05/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.7765 0.0256 4.3E-28 173.4414 80.7424 0.8364 
D=2 0.7795 0.0255 1.4317 173.541 82.3179 2.0246 
D=3 0.9456 0.014 50.0866 186.8996 188.9191 121.003 
Non-Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 07/05/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.2844 0.0318 3.923 6.5131 42.6959 142.4559 
D=2 0.1792 0.0202 15.4318 17.1666 113.7006 163.3697 
D=3 0.0931 0.0136 48.8528 90.0204 163.7189 170.6493 
Non-Linear case, period from 07/05/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.8135 0.0261 1.4528 143.904 80.9995 0.2669 
D=2 0.8545 0.0227 9.8816 143.9304 86.8275 14.5188 
D=3 0.9786 0.0066 37.5591 144.1306 145.9172 139.4704 
Estimates are based on D=1, 2, 3 instruments. The instruments are: a constant (that is D=1), 
lagged difference between Spread and CDS (D=2), as well as the lagged difference Spread 
(D=3). The equations (2) and (3) are estimated using GMM both the linear (p=1) and non-
linear case (p=2).  
J-statistics are distributed as X2 (D-1 for D>1) a
J
ˆ and X 
2
(D) for   the remaining J.  
Critical values for Χ
2 
(2): at 1% 9.21, at 5% 5.99, and at 10% 4.60. 
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In addition, we use J-statistics for three null hypotheses, aaH
ˆ:
0
=  (from 
the estimation), α=0.2, and α=0.8, the latter two representing optimistic 
and pessimistic preferences respectively. In particular for the non-linear 
loss function and for ‘α’ that are statistically different from 0.5 the 
likelihood to reject the null of 0.8 is lower. Indeed, in many 
specifications, the asymmetric J-stat of the null of α=0.8 is not rejected. 
This is evidence in favour of the hypothesis of pessimism.  
Moreover, these results indicate that post May 2010 market assigns 
higher loss for the case that CDS is lower than the spread that is for 
positive values in the difference between spread and CDS (see Diagram 
4, right hand scale of the horizontal axis).  Moreover, Diagram 4 depicts 
the asymmetry of the loss function as estimated post May 2010.  
DIAGRAM 4: Asymmetric loss functions (α>0.5) 
 
Note: horizontal axis shows Spreadt-CDSt, whilst on the vertical axis is the quadratic loss 
function, L(p=2,α). 
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Note, that post May 2010, the slope of the loss function is steeper for 
positive values in the difference between spread and CDS. This implies 
that the loss for the market is much higher when the CDS, the insurance 
premium against default, is lower than the spread. Thus, post May 2010 
the market clearly exhibits a preference towards higher CDS than 
Spreads. This may not imply departure from prudency, but rather a 
safety mechanism against higher probability of default. Moreover, this 
revealed preference could suggest that according to the market the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis would eventually lead to default. 
A question might arise then; could this result in the detection of a 
realignment of in market’s expectations in recent months? Note that 
assigning higher loss for the case that spread is higher than the CDS 
suggests that the market sees arbitrage opportunities in the case of 
Greek sovereign debt that are too good to miss out. To this end, an 
asymmetric loss function that leans towards pessimism could be 
considered under those preferences to reflect prudency, as it reveals the 
market’s perception that the Greek economy eventually will default to 
some extent, though at the first site it deviates from rational behaviour 
and thus efficiency. However, note that unless all participants of Greek 
sovereign bonds share the same underlying loss function, asymmetry 
and thus pessimism would indicate deviation from rationality. 
5.5 Explaining Alpha 
The sensitivity analysis of last session shows breakdowns in the Greek 
sovereign bond spreads post May 2010. Since May 2010 the underlying 
martket’s preferences   show a clear shift towards higher loss for the 
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case that CDS is lower than spread. This implies that market preferences 
of Greek sovereign bonds have shifted clearly towards pessimism. This 
asymmetry in the underlying loss function of Greek sovereign bond 
spreads insinuate arbitrage opportunities, also reflecting sizeable risks 
regarding long- term sustainability of Greek public finances.  
Having derived market’s expectations over the Euro area sovereign debt 
crisis, as reflected by the shape parameter ‘alpha’, ‘α’, we examine the 
impact of fiscal policy institutions and fiscal rules on those expectations 
in recent years; from 1
st
 quarter 2009 to 2
nd
 quarter of 2011. The sample 
includes Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Over the last decade 
the number of fiscal rules in the Euro area has substantially increased 
(Public Finances in EMU, 2006 and 2007). There are many different fiscal 
rules, i.e. on the revenue side, on the expenditure side, on the central 
and on the general sovereign. We adopt the classification   of fiscal rules 
as appears in Public Finances in EMU (2006).  In addition, we examine 
the impact of fiscal institutions on markets perceptions over sovereign 
debt sustainability. 
Moreover, following the methodology of Deroose, Moulin, and Wierts 
(2005) EU Commission constructs a Fiscal Rule Index based on certain 
criteria (see EU Commission, DG ECFIN, Fiscal Rules, 2009). In this paper 
we shall follow this methodology and adopt EU Commissions Fiscal Rule 
Index as our fiscal rule variable. Similarly, for the fiscal institutions 
variable we shall follow the data set of EU Commission that describes 
such institutions in the form fiscal councils. Moreover, for the present 
version of this paper we shall focus on fiscal councils that comply with 
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the characteristic of providing an independent assessment of 
compliance with existing national fiscal rules. 
Fiscal rules and fiscal institutions to the extent that one should assume 
that they would improve perceptions over the fiscal sustainability of 
sovereign shall assert a negative impact on ‘α’. Higher ‘α’ translates into 
higher loss for the case that spread is higher than the CDS. This 
asymmetry in the underlying loss function insinuates a shift towards 
pessimism regarding long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Table 5 reports empirical evidence of a random effect regression of ‘α’ 
with respect to fiscal rules and fiscal institutions but also specific market 
characteristics. Both fiscal rules and fiscal institutions assert a negative 
impact on ‘α’ implying that improve market’s expectations regarding 
fiscal sustainability. 
In addition, we also include several Z-variables to account for general 
economic and financial conditions, Euribor 3 M, iTraxx Main Investment 
Grade index, outstanding bonds as a ratio to GDP, spread (defined as 
Euribor-Eurepo).
8
 
                                                 
8
 Euribor 3M accounts for the risk free rate. The risk free rate could assert a negative impact 
on spreads as an increase in risk-free rate would decrease the present value of the expected 
future cash flows. The iTraxx Main Investment Grade index counts for corporate credit risk. 
As a measure of fiscal sustainability issues we opt for the total outstanding bonds as 
percentage to GDP. Bloomberg reports the amount of bonds outstanding on a monthly 
frequency.  
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TABLE 5: Random Effect Panel regression for ‘α’ 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
Euribor 3M 0.030304 0.054622 0.55 0.618 
Spread 0.140923 0.137924 1.02 0.382 
Itrx -0.00013 0.000298 -0.44 0.687 
Debt -0.02275 0.016005 -1.42 0.25 
FR -0.212110 0.012417 -11.46 0.001 
FI -0.020596 0.018511 -1.112 0.848 
C 0.542409 0.108786 4.99 0.016 
 
R
2
 0.4629    
The Random Effect GLS estimation is used and the sample covers the period from from Q1 
2009 to Q2 2011. The regression of the alpha is: 
αit = β0 +  β1 Euribort + β2 (Euribor-Eurepo)t + β3 iTraxxt + β4 FRit + β5FIit + β6  Debtit  
Spread is the difference between Euribor and Eurepo, FR counts for fiscal rules, whilst FI for 
fiscal institutions. 
The sample includes the following countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. 
 
A common criticism on random effect panel regression analysis hints to 
issues of static nature of such analysis and endogeneity. To deal with 
these issues we also run Dynamic Panel Analysis that uses an 
instrumental variable GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995).  
Table 6 reports empirical evidence of DPD panel regressions. As above, 
both fiscal rules and fiscal institutions assert a negative impact on ‘α’. 
Fiscal rules and fiscal institutions assert a negative impact on ‘α’. This 
implies that enhancing fiscal governance would improve market’s 
expectations over fiscal sustainability.   
Similarly, the Euribor-Eurepo spread asserts a positive impact on ‘α’. This 
result also implies that when the repo rate is lower that the Euribor then 
it is costly to implement negative ‘‘basis’’ trade, buying sovereign BOND 
AND CDS.  
  33 
TABLE 6: Dynamic Panel Data regression for α 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
αt-1 -0.19572 0.169839 -1.15 0.249 
Euribor 3M -0.19522 3.026098 -0.06 0.949 
spread -0.31373 3.060508 -0.1 0.918 
itrx 0.000149 0.000667 0.22 0.823 
FR -0.254 0.075804 -3.35 0.001 
FI -0.05824 0.061229 -0.95 0.341 
Debt 1.69E-11 8.23E-12 2.05 0.041 
C 1.437415 0.449672 3.2 0.001 
Wald chi2(7) 16.27 Prob > chi2 0.0227  
The Dynamic Panel Data regression is based on Arelano and Bover estimation and uses 
quarterly observations from Q1 2009 to Q2 2011. The regression equation takes the form: 
αit = β0 + β1 alphait-1 + β2 Euribort + β3 (Euribor-Eurepo)t + β4 iTraxxt + β5 FRit + β6FIit + β7  Debtit  
Spread is the difference between Euribor and Eurepo, FR counts for fiscal rules, whilst FI for 
fiscal institutions. 
The sample includes the following countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. 
 
The empirical evidence of random effect panel regression and dynamic 
panel analysis shows that there is a link between fiscal rules, fiscal 
institutions and market’s expectations. Moreover, fiscal rules and 
institutions appear to improve expectations over the long term 
sustainability of public finances in five member states of the Euro area, 
namely Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. In some detail, fiscal 
rules have a much stronger in terms of magnitude impact on market’s 
preferences than fiscal institutions. Thus, fiscal governance plays an 
important role in shaping preferences over the current sovereign debt 
crisis. Improving fiscal governance will also improve market’s 
expectations.  
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5.6 Panel-VAR model 
Next, we will extend our analysis using a Panel-VAR analysis. All variables 
within the panel VAR enter as endogenous. Thus, the underlying 
causality between the estimated ‘α’ and fiscal rules and institutions, as 
well as market specific variables would be identified. For assisting the 
exposition we consider a first order 4x4 panel-VAR model: 
tiitiit e ,1 +Φ+= −
XX
µ
,  i =1,…, N, t=1,…,T.                                               (13) 
where Xit is a vector of four random variables, that is, ‘αit’ and fiscal rules 
(FRit) as well as a market specific variable EURIBOR (EUborit) and debt 
measured as  outstanding bonds over GDP, (Dit).Thus, Φ is an 4x4 matrix 
of coefficients, μi is a vector of m individual effects and ei,t are iid 
residuals.   
The panel-VAR takes the following form: 
αit = a10 + β11 jα1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β12 jFR1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β13 jD1it− j + β14 jEUbor1it− j +
j=1
J
∑
j=1
J
∑ e1i,t
FRit = a20 + β21 jα1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β22 jFR1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β23 jD1it− j + β24 jEUbor1it− j +
j=1
J
∑
j=1
J
∑ e2i,t
Dit = a30 + β31 jα1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β32 jFR1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β33 jD1it− j + β34 jEUbor1it− j +
j=1
J
∑
j=1
J
∑ e3i,t
EUborit = a40 + β41 jα1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β42 jFR1it− j
j=1
J
∑ + β43 jD1it− j + β44 jEUbor1it− j +
j=1
J
∑
j=1
J
∑ e4i,t
            (14)                                                                                                                            
The moving averages (MA) form of the above model sets αit, FRit, Dit and 
EUborit equal to a set of present and past residuals e1, e2, e3 and e4 from 
the panel-VAR estimation.
 9
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The moving averages (MA) form of the model sets αit, FRt, Dit and EUborit equal to a set of 
present and past residuals e1, e2, e3 and e4 from the panel-VAR estimation. The endogeneity 
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Panel-VAR estimations 
Following Lutkepohl (2006) we test for the optimal lag order j. As 
optimal lag we opt for order of one based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Arellano-Bond AR tests.
10
 Additional lags are added 
when testing for autocorrelation. Sargan tests show that for lag ordered 
one the null hypothesis is accepted. Normality tests for the residuals 
based on Sahpiro-Francia W-test have been also applied.
11
   
The impulse response functions (IRF) derived from the unrestricted 
panel-VAR in the case of ‘α’ are reported in Diagram 5.  
                                                                                                                                            
assumption implies residuals are correlated and therefore one cannot interpret the 
coefficients of the MA representation. Thus, residuals are orthogonalised by multiplying the 
MA representation with the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the 
residuals ε1, ε2, ε3 and ε4. The orthogonalized, or structural, representation is: 
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where P is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the residuals: 
1
44342414
43332313
42322212
41312111
),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(
−
=














PP
eeCoveeCoveeCoveeCov
eeCoveeCoveeCoveeCov
eeCoveeCoveeCoveeCov
eeCoveeCoveeCoveeCov
itititititititit
itititititititit
itititititititit
itititititititit
   
10
 Results are available upon request. 
11
 The results do not show violation of the normality. Panel Var results are available under 
request. Note that we follow Love and Zicchino (2006) and apply forward mean-differenced 
using the Helmert procedure in all variables within the VAR. In addition, we report standard 
errors for impulse response functions (IRF) generated with Monte Carlo simulations. 
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DIAGRAM 5: Impulse Response Function (IRF) for ‘α’, FR, EUbor and d 
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of alpha FR1 EUbor d
response of alpha to alpha shock
s
0 6
-0.0399
0.1323
response of alpha to FR1 shock
s
0 6
-0.0109
0.0000
response of alpha to EUbor shock
s
0 6
-0.0090
0.0344
response of alpha to d shock
s
0 6
-0.0171
0.0607
response of FR1 to alpha shock
s
0 6
0.0000
0.0322
response of FR1 to FR1 shock
s
0 6
0.0000
0.1633
response of FR1 to EUbor shock
s
0 6
-0.0478
0.0000
response of FR1 to d shock
s
0 6
0.0000
0.0362
response of EUbor to alpha shock
s
0 6
-0.4212
0.0000
response of EUbor to FR1 shock
s
0 6
-0.3198
0.0000
response of EUbor to EUbor shock
s
0 6
0.0000
0.5767
response of EUbor to d shock
s
0 6
-0.2979
0.0000
response of d to alpha shock
s
0 6
-0.3264
0.1724
response of d to FR1 shock
s
0 6
-0.1217
0.0387
response of d to EUbor shock
s
0 6
-0.2628
0.1211
response of d to d shock
s
0 6
-0.1837
0.6197
 
Note: ‘α’ counts for the shape parameter of the underlying loss function, FR1 counts for 
fiscal rules as measured by the Fiscal Rule Index of the EU Commission, EUbor is the Euribor 
3M and d is the outstanding debt. 
 
The plots report the response of each variable in the panel-VAR, ‘α’, 
fiscal rules (FR), Euribor 3M (EUbor) and outstanding debt (d), to its own 
innovation and to the innovations of the other variables.   
The first row shows the response of ‘α’ on a one standard deviation 
shock in FR, EUbor and d. It is clear from the graph that the response of 
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‘α’ to FR is negative over the whole period, reaching a pick after two 
periods and converges towards equilibrium thereafter.  On the other 
hand, a shock in EUbor and d asserts a positive impact on ‘α’.  Note that 
there is also some reverse causation, notably in the case of response of 
Euribor to a shock in ‘α’, which is negative and substantial in magnitude. 
Similarly, the response of outstanding debt to ‘α’ is negative and 
substantial though after two periods reverses to positive and converges 
to zero thereafter. On the other hand the response of fiscal rules on a 
shock in ‘α’ is quite small, yet it is positive.  
Table 7 presents the variance decomposition (VDC) estimations. These 
results are consistent with the impulse response functions (IRF) and 
provide further evidence of the importance of fiscal rules in explaining 
the variation in ‘α’.  
TABLE 7: Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for 1 lag of ‘α’, Fiscal rules, 
Euribor 3M and Debt 
 S ‘α’ Fiscal Rules Euribor 3M Debt 
‘α’ 10 0.776505 0.008763 0.055136 0.1595 
Fiscal Rules  10 0.056447 0.750145 0.120463 0.0729 
Euribor 3M 10 0.17881 0.390184 0.302408 0.1285 
Debt 10 0.247488 0.03368 0.127624 0.5912 
‘α’ 20 0.775178 0.009923 0.055376 0.1595 
Fiscal Rules  20 0.06233 0.720926 0.135091 0.0816 
Euribor 3M 20 0.160606 0.433296 0.28055 0.1255 
Debt 20 0.246447 0.037461 0.127977 0.5881 
Note: s defines the periods ahead of VDCs.   
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Specifically, close to 1% of forecast error variance of ‘α’ after 10 years is 
explained by fiscal rules. Note, however, the outstanding debt has the 
dominant contribution, close to 15%, in the variation of ‘α’. 
Furthermore, Euribor 3M explains 5.5% of the variation of ‘α’ efficiency. 
Overall, the VDC analysis confirms the importance of fiscal rules to ‘α’. 
Duffie (2010) suggest that banks tend to be undercapitalised during 
financial crisis and this in effect would lead to arbitrage opportunities. In 
an earlier paper Mitchell and Pulvino (2009) demonstrate that during the 
credit crunch of 2008 illiquid markets contributed to rising costs of 
holding sovereign bonds due to possible high haircuts. In turn, 
worsening liquidity conditions would feed up into higher sovereign 
bonds spreads and CDS. The IRFs and VDCs would imply that a shift 
towards pessimism has taken place during debt crisis that could be the 
outcome also of liquidity constraints that the Euro area member states 
face. Enhancing fiscal governance and strengthening fiscal rules could 
reverse this spiral, as it appears, improve market’s expectations over the 
fiscal sustainability as depicted by asymmetries in the underlying loss 
function of the ‘basis’.
 12
 
6. Conclusion 
In the early days of the euro, the risk premiums on the Euro area 
sovereign bonds were narrowed, whilst exhibiting low volatility.  The 
market judged, back then, the probability of sovereign default was 
                                                 
12
 Note that the revealed underlying preferences of the ‘basis’ due to credit ratings in illiquid 
market conditions would also have financial stability implications. Negative feedback effects 
have emerged together with counterparty risk (creditworthiness of protection providers) 
that in turn could feed back to the ‘α’ dynamics. In general as risk in the inter-bank sector 
increases default protection becomes less valuable. 
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negligible. Since 2009 market’s perception has been dramatically shifted 
towards asserting very high probabilities of default for several Euro area 
member states, with Greece reaching at times the highest probability of 
default worldwide. 
Our results provide a new source of information for understanding the 
market’s preferences regarding the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro 
area. Often it is referred that the market speculates and that this is the 
main reason that the spreads are driven upwards. This paper reveals 
that market behavior over time have clearly shifted towards pessimism, 
insinuating that the risk attitude of major market participants has been 
altered. We find asymmetry in the underlying loss function of the market 
with regards to some member states, in particular for Greece, sovereign 
bonds. The growing pessimism of markets over time and despite the 
financial assistance put in place, in particular for Greece, leaves little 
space of having any sign of reducing Euro area sovereign debt 
uncertainty any time soon. This comes in contrast with recent 
communications of some signals that would be interpreted as possible 
recovery from the on going sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. Our 
results show that markets have not been convinced and remain rather 
pessimistic.  
An increase in pessimism could be considered under certain conditions, 
such as periods of intense uncertainty, to reflect prudent preferences. 
Therefore, assigning higher loss when the spread is above CDS could 
improve market efficiency. Alas, as there is no ‘one size fits all’ case 
judgement over what is prudent behaviour away from a symmetric loss 
function must be applied with extreme caution. Moreover, to the extent 
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that not all participants of sovereign bond markets share the same 
underlying loss function, asymmetry and thus pessimism would indicate 
deviation from rationality. 
Regarding the impact of fiscal rules and institutions on market 
behaviour, empirical findings show that they improve market’s 
expectations over fiscal sustainability. As a result, enhancing fiscal 
governance could reduce the degree of market’s pessimism regarding 
the Euro area sovereign debt crisis.  
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Appendix 
TABLE A1: t-stat and p-values of structural break in 5 yr CDS, weekly  
PORTUGAL - Structural break in March 2010 
 tm,n,τ p-values 
 τ=1 
Scheme=1 3.2183 0.0111 
Scheme=2 3.9286 0.0269 
Scheme=3 3.1584 0.0552 
 τ=2 
Scheme=1 2.2064 0.0380 
Scheme=2 2.8162 0.0347 
Scheme=3 2.5665 0.0586 
 τ=12 
Scheme=1 2.0909 0.0137 
Scheme=2 2.3749 0.0846 
Scheme=3 2.2941 0.0978 
IRELAND - Structural break in March 2010 
 tm,n,τ p-values 
 τ=1 
Scheme=1 3.1022 0.0135 
Scheme=2 2.4243 0.0772 
Scheme=3 3.3398 0.0901 
 τ=2 
Scheme=1 2.0901 0.0177 
Scheme=2 2.3890 0.0824 
Scheme=3 2.3129 0.0946 
 τ=12 
Scheme=1 1.9680 0.0665 
Scheme=2 2.0831 0.0649 
Scheme=3 2.0645 0.0614 
Scheme 1 is the fixed scheme, where the in-sample window at time t contains observations 
indexed 1,…,m; scheme 2 is a rolling scheme, where in-sample window at time t contains 
observations indexed t-m+1,…,t; and last scheme 3 is a recursive scheme, where the in-
sample window includes observations indexed 1,…,t. The lag for the Newey-West estimator 
is opted as n1/3 of the asymptotic variance. 
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TABLE A2: t-stat and p-values of structural break in 5 yr CDS, weekly 
ITALY - Structural break in March 2010 
 tm,n,τ p-values 
 τ=1 
Scheme=1 2.2183 0.0611 
Scheme=2 2.9286 0.0269 
Scheme=3 2.1584 0.0552 
 τ=2 
Scheme=1 2.2064 0.0618 
Scheme=2 2.8162 0.0347 
Scheme=3 2.5665 0.0586 
 τ=12 
Scheme=1 2.0909 0.0677 
Scheme=2 2.3749 0.0846 
Scheme=3 2.2941 0.0978 
SPAIN - Structural break in March 2010 
 tm,n,τ p-values 
 τ=1 
Scheme=1 2.1022 0.0652 
Scheme=2 2.4243 0.0772 
Scheme=3 2.3398 0.0901 
 τ=2 
Scheme=1 2.0901 0.0618 
Scheme=2 2.3890 0.0824 
Scheme=3 2.3129 0.0946 
 τ=12 
Scheme=1 2.9680 0.0265 
Scheme=2 2.0831 0.0611 
Scheme=3 2.0645 0.0623 
Scheme 1 is the fixed scheme, where the in-sample window at time t contains observations 
indexed 1,…,m; scheme 2 is a rolling scheme, where in-sample window at time t contains 
observations indexed t-m+1,…,t; and last scheme 3 is a recursive scheme, where the in-
sample window includes observations indexed 1,…,t. The lag for the Newey-West estimator 
is opted as n1/3 of the asymptotic variance. 
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TABLE A3: Asymmetric loss function for 5 yr Spreads over swap and 
CDS, weekly 
ITALY 
Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.447 0.01 0.00 258.47 593.72 666.15 
D=2 0.446 0.01 0.03 258.57 593.72 666.15 
D=3 0.401 0.00 31.34 585.96 621.37 667.09 
Linear case, period from 27/04/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.606 0.00 0.00 529.76 563.11 569.51 
D=2 0.606 0.00 0.00 529.76 563.11 569.51 
D=3 0.66 0.00 21.00 546.04 618.70 635.31 
 
SPAIN 
Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.416 0.012 0.000 46.201 422.486 587.367 
D=2 0.480 0.010 30.463 88.452 426.965 587.509 
D=3 0.402 0.002 81.862 623.770 596.035 599.454 
Linear case, period from 27/04/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.739 0.005 0.000 325.484 508.293 547.332 
D=2 0.739 0.005 0.000 325.484 508.293 547.332 
D=3 0.701 0.000 65.560 490.085 512.173 580.552 
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PORTUGAL 
Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.553 0.019 0.000 240.039 8.067 141.671 
D=2 0.548 0.018 229.437 276.338 241.219 216.936 
D=3 0.413 0.011 312.004 321.020 439.682 406.725 
Linear case, period from 27/04/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.668 0.020 0.000 186.394 49.060 45.437 
D=2 0.668 0.020 0.000 186.394 49.060 45.437 
D=3 0.758 0.005 202.515 190.197 257.023 304.226 
 
IRELAND 
Linear case, period from 05/09/2008 to 27/04/2010 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.268 0.017 0.000 16.556 153.944 422.716 
D=2 0.267 0.017 2.575 18.050 156.806 422.930 
D=3 0.136 0.004 187.357 488.949 452.898 450.988 
Linear case, period from 27/04/2010 to 22/07/2011 
 aˆ  SE aJ ˆ  2.0=αJ  5.0=αJ  8.0=αJ  
D=1 0.165 0.015 0.000 5.395 202.167 314.081 
D=2 0.165 0.015 0.000 5.395 202.167 314.081 
D=3 0.111 0.002 127.702 269.430 256.504 353.170 
Estimates are based on D=1, 2, 3 instruments. The instruments are: a constant (that is D=1), 
lagged difference between Spread and CDS (D=2), as well as the lagged difference Spread 
(D=3). The equations (2) and (3) are estimated using GMM both the linear (p=1) and non-
linear case (p=2).  
J-statistics are distributed as X2 (D-1 for D>1) aJ ˆ and X 
2
(D) for   the remaining J.  
Critical values for Χ2 (2): at 1% 9.21, at 5% 5.99, and at 10% 4.60. 
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